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HAS TRINITARIANISM BEEN SHOWN
TO BE COHERENT?
E. Feser

Macnamara, La Palme Reyes, and Reyes have recently claimed to have
shown decisively that the doctrine of the Trinity is internally consistent.
They claim, furthermore, that their account does not commit them to any
exotic emendations of standard logical theory. The paper demonstrates that
they have established neither of these claims. In particular, it is argued that
the set of statements they show to be consistent in fact expresses
Sabellianism, not Trinitarianism; and that they can avoid this result only via
commitment to the (questionable) doctrine of relative identity.

It is generally acknowledged that it is extraordinarily difficult (some
would say impossible) to show the doctrine of the Trinity to be logically
consistent. Most recent attempts to do so have relied on controversial
(some would say desperate) revisions of standard logical doctrines.!
And these seem not to have gained a wide following even among those
who accept the doctrine. Indeed, some among the latter maintain that
no one has yet done the job. 2 But in their recent article ilLogic and the
Trinity," Macnamara, La Palme Reyes, and Reyes boldly claim to have
lain to rest "once and for all" any fear that Trinitarianism is logically
inconsistent. 3 Moreover, they claim that their attempt to do so does not
commit them to any '''tampering' with the foundations of 10gic."4 I hope
to show that both claims are dubious at best.
Macnamara et al. follow Cartwright5 in taking the following seven
sentences, extracted from the Athanasian Creed, as stating the essentials
of the Trinitarian doctrine:
(1) The Father is God.
(2) The Son is God.
(3) The Holy Spirit is God.
(4) The Father is not the Son.
(5) The Father is not the Holy Spirit.
(6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit.
(7) There is exactly one God.

They also follow him in holding that, though these sentences are
acceptable as they stand, certain accounts of their logical structure are
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unacceptable. For example, to take the "is" of (1)-(3) as expressing identity would entail either Tritheism or Sabellianism, both of which are
heretical. They allow, however, that the "is" of (4)-(6) is rightly taken as
expressing identity. For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that
this much of what Macnamara et al. say is unproblematic.
Another construal considered by Cartwright involves taking "God"
as a count noun, which, together with the interpretation of (4)-(6)
already accepted, yields the following revised set of sentences:
(1a) The Father is a God.
(2a) The Son is a God.
(3a) The Holy Spirit is a God.
(4a) The Father is not identical with the Son.
(Sa) The Father is not identical with the Holy Spirit.
(6a) The Son is not identical with the Holy Spirit.
(7a) There is exactly one God.
Now Cartwright holds that this is an inconsistent set, on the basis,
Macnamara et al. think, of the following general principle, which he
takes to be "evident to the natural light of reason":
(P) If every A is a B, then there cannot be fewer B's than A'S.6
For if (P) is true, then since (1a)-(3a) tell us that every Divine Person is a
God, it follows that there cannot be fewer Gods than Divine Persons;
and (4a)-(6a) entail that there are at least three Divine Persons. It follows
that there are three Gods; but this, of course, contradicts (7a).
(Cartwright, incidentally, does not go on to suggest a construal of (1)-(7)
that is both logically consistent and avoids heresy, and presumably does
not think that anyone has (yet?) shown there to be one.)
Macnamara et al. accept (1a)-(7a) as a statement of Trinitarianism,
indeed, as correctly giving the logical form of (1)-(7).7 But they insist,
against Cartwright, that these sentences are not inconsistent. Their aim
is to show this by giving a model for (1a)-(7a), that is, an interpretation
of the sentences on which each comes out true. They write:
The difficult part of giving a model of the doctrine of the Trinity
is to give for all the expressions used an interpretation that is in
keeping with the logical principles that handle the interpretation
of natural-language sentences. The interpretation need not be
the natural or even the orthodox one. It must respect the logical
structure of the sentences and should retain the standard interpretation of the quantifiers and sentential connectives. Such a
model merely shows that the set of sentences is capable of a consistent interpretation. 8
This limited strategy of merely providing a model, Macnamara et al. say,
has the advantage that it enables them to avoid dealing with theological
details such as the precise significance of the term "person."
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The crux of their case is the rejection of (P). For (P), say Macnamara et
al., forces us into an interpretation of (la)-(3a) in terms of set-theoretic
inclusion. And on such an interpretation, if every member of the set of
A's is a member of the set of B's, then the members of the set of B's cannot
be less numerous than the members of the set of A's, so that, indeed, there
cannot be fewer Gods than Divine Persons. They argue that (P) is false,
that is, that it is possible for each A to be a B, and yet there are fewer B's
than A's; so that another interpretation of (la)-(3a) is also possible.
Now Macnamara et al. introduce a rather involved technical apparatus to present their model, but the gist of it can be stated in quite
straightforward language. They start by giving what they claim are
everyday counterexamples to (P). Consider, for instance, that airlines
commonly count passengers in such a way that the same person, if he
has taken three separate flights, may be counted as a passenger three
times. We have, then, a case in which every passenger is a person, and
yet there are fewer persons than passengers. (The other examples given
differ in no significant respect from this one.) The relation between passengers and persons, Macnamara et al. conclude, is not that of set-theoretic inclusion. Instead, it is what they call the "underlying relation," a
relation which is such that one person can underlie several passengers,
one student can underlie several majors, and so forth. And it is this relation, they claim, which is expressed by "is" in (la)-(3a).
The definite descriptions "the Father," "the Son," and "the Holy Spirit"
function in (la)-(6a) like proper names, according to Macnamara et aJ.9
And proper names, they say, must be interpreted relative to a kind, which
is the referent of a count noun. For instance, the proper name "Jane" is
interpreted relative to the kind: person (named by the count noun "person"). Similarly, "the Father," "the Son," and "the Holy Spirit" are to be
interpreted relative to the kind: Divine person. That is, they pick out individuals in the kind: Divine Person; and not in the kind: God.
Given what has been said so far, Macnamara et al. present as further
clarifying the logical structure of (la)-(3a) the sentences:
(la') Underlying the Divine Person that is the Father is a God.
(2a') Underlying the Divine Person that is the Son is a God.
(3a') Underlying the Divine Person that is the Holy Spirit is a God.
Now the Divine Persons are differentiated by distinct properties like
those mentioned in the Athanasian Creed: The Father alone generates
the Son; the Son alone is generated by the Father; and the Holy Spirit
alone proceeds from the Father and the Son.1O Given these distinct properties, and Leibniz's law, it follows that the three Divine Persons are distinct from one another. What, then, can keep us from inferring that
there must be three Gods, each having one of these distinct properties?
After all, if we know that passenger A is tall, and passenger B is short,
we must conclude that there are two different persons underlying them.
"What blocks this line of reasoning, and the heretical conclusion," say
Macnamara et al., "is that in the theory of kinds predicables are typed by
count nouns."ll Consider a predicable such as "dull." It denotes a dif-
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ferent property depending on whether we apply it to a knife or a day.
And something similar can be said about many predicables. In particular, something similar can be said about some predicables when they are
used in contexts in which the underlying relation obtains: A particular
person may underlie a given thief; but it does not follow that if he is a
good thief, he is also a good person. Relative to the count noun "thief,"
"good" denotes one property, but it may not denote the same one relative to the count noun "person." When a predicable does not denote the
same property relative to one count noun as it does relative to another,
Macnamara et al. say that it does not "keep phase" from the one to the
other. Given these notions, Macnamara et al. argue that the predicables
"generates the Son," "is generated by the Father," and "proceeds from
the Father and the Son" "do not keep phase as they transfer from
'Divine Person' to 'God,'" and that "[tlhis logical fact blocks the threat of
either Tritheism or Sabellianism."12 The Father, for example, begets the
Son, and God underlies the Father, but it does not follow that God
begets the Son.
The argument can be summarized, then, as follows: The copula "is"
in (1a)-(3a) expresses the underlying relation. So it is possible that the
three Divine Persons are distinct, and yet there is but one God. (4a)-(6a)
tell us that the three are in fact distinct, and that their individuating
properties do not themselves tend to show that there must be three Gods
is guaranteed by the fact that the predicables denoting them do not keep
phase from "the Father," lithe Son," and "the Holy Spirit," respectively,
to "God." (1a)-(6a), then, do not entail the falsity of (7a). So it is possible
to give an interpretation of (1a)-(7a) on which each sentence comes out
true. So there is a model for (1a)-(7a). So they are consistent.13
What should we think of this argument? Have Macnamara et al.
accomplished what they set out to do? I think not. Consider first the
rather startling claim, quoted above, that for the purposes of demonstrating the consistency of the sentences stating the doctrine of the
Trinity, an adequate interpretation of them "need not be ... even the
orthodox one." It is hard to see how an unorthodox interpretation of the
sentences stating Trinitarianism could still be an interpretation of
Trinitarian sentences. Indeed, if orthodoxy is no concern, it is hard to see
why we should reject the construal on which the "is" of (1)-(3) expresses
identity, even though this would result in heresy, if this would give us a
consistent set. Yet, as noted above, Macnamara et al. reject this construal
precisely because it leads to such a result. As well they should: The sentences, thus interpreted, would not express Trinitarianism at all, and
their consistency would therefore be irrelevant to the purpose of showing Trinitarianism to be consistent. 14
At any rate, Macnamara et al. have, it turns out, good reason for making this surprising claim. For their construal of (1a)-(7a) seems itself to
lead (no doubt inadvertently) to Sabellianism. Consider again their
example of airline passengers. No doubt, there is a sense in which, say,
passenger A and passenger B are different passengers, even if they are
the same person (Smith, say), as is reflected in airline accounting practices. But there is also clearly a sense in which they are the same passen-
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ger. For passenger A is identical to Smith, and so is passenger B; so they
are the same passenger. Indeed, that this is so is also clear from ordinary language. Someone might say: "Why, that's the same passenger
that flew with us last week!" As such, in these ordinary cases, whenever
we find that the same A underlies different B's, we can conclude that the
B's are all identical; for each B is identical to A, so they must be identical
to each other as well. This is obviously true of all the examples
Macnamara et al. offer. They say that a single student may major in two
subjects, and so be two majors; that a single person may be the patient of
both a urologist and a heart specialist, and so be two patients; and so
forth. IS Well, fine. Nevertheless, the philosophy major and the mathematics major are both identical to the same student, so they are identical
to each other, and thus are, in one sense, the same major; and the urologist's patient and the heart specialist's patient are both identical to the
same person, so they are identical to each other, and thus are, in one
sense, the same patient.
The same thing, however, can only be said in the case of the Divine
Persons and God on pain of Sabellianism. The same God is said to
underlie each of the different Divine Persons, the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit. But if he "underlies" them in the same way that one
thing underlies another in the ordinary cases, then we must conclude
that each Divine Person is identical to God, and thus that all of them are
identical to each other. The resulting (Sabellian) construals of (la)-(3a)
thus contradict (4a)-(6a), and the model fails. Macnamara et al. may
wish to claim that "underlies" doesn't in this case behave logically in the
way it does in the ordinary cases. But this would be nothing more than
special pleading, and would at any rate be completely implausible, since
the ordinary cases were themselves supposed to reveal to us the logic of
the underlying relation. 16
It might be thought that the fact that "generates the Son" does not
keep phase from "the Father" to "God," etc. shows that e.g. the Father
and God cannot be identical. But even if this were true, it would not
undermine the point that the "underlies" reading of (la)-(3a) does entail
that they are identical. At any rate, it is not true: "Good" does not keep
phase from "thief" to "person," yet a good thief is still a person.
Notice also that what has been said shows that Macnamara et al. are
simply mistaken in thinking that the ordinary cases they cite are counterexamples to (P). If passenger A is identical to the person Smith, and
passenger B is identical to the person Smith, then if there is a sense in
which there are two different passengers, then in the same sense, there
are also two different persons. Again, ordinary usage supports this.
The same airline that counts passengers on different flights as different
passengers may well count persons on different flights as different persons. Someone wanting to determine the total number of tickets sold
might say "Tell me how many persons were on the last two flights," and
his purposes would obviously be frustrated if some persons were counted only once because they were on both flights. So long as we keep the
senses involved straight, there just aren't fewer persons than passengers.
(P) holds in these cases as well as in all the others.
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There is a way of construing (4a)-{6a) so that they do not conflict with
OaH3a). We could take the different Divine Persons to be different
"modes" of God. They would still be distinct: The mode of being the
Father is not identical to the mode of being the Son, even though the
Father and the Son are the same God, in the same sense that being a professor is not the same as being a husband, even though the same person
may be both a professor and a husband. But though contradiction
would thus be avoided, the Sabellianism or modalism would become
even more pronounced. Macnamara et al., as noted, do state that an
adequate interpretation need not be orthodox. But again, the resulting
sentences would seem to be, not Trinitarian, but heretical, ones; and
Macnamara et al. themselves reject other such interpretations.
The Sabellian tendency of the account offered by Macnamara et al. is
even more evident when we consider their brief {and not entirely clear}
closing discussion of "the notion of an entity in a system of kinds."17
They argue that "there is a definite sense in which there is only one entity or being involved in the Trinitarian doctrine."ls Underlying the kinds:
professor, student, man, woman, husband, and so forth, they say, is the
kind: person. "Two members of different kinds correspond to the same
entity if their underlying persons coincide."19 For instance, if Smith is
both a professor and a husband, then the persons underlying a member
of the kind: professor and a member of the kind: husband "coincide," so
that the members "correspond to the same entity." Likewise,
Macnamara et al. say:
In the case of the Trinitarian doctrine there is only one entity or
being obtained by the following identification:

DIVINE PERSON

It seems very difficult to interpret all of this in any other way than as
entailing Sabellianism, especially when we consider what we have seen
above regarding the underlying relation. How else are we to take the
analogy between a husband, professor, and person, on the one hand,
and the Divine Persons and God, on the other? If the Divine Persons are
to God as the roles of husband and professor are to a person, what else
could they be but "modes" of God? And how else are we to take the
talk of "identification" in the given diagram, other than as implying that
each of the Divine Persons is identical to the "one entity" God (and consequently, to each of the others)? Given what else they say in their
paper, I do not believe that Macnamara et al. intend to argue for
Sabellianism. But as far as I can tell, they've managed to do so anyway.
Now there may be one move Macnamara et al. could make which
would allow them to sidestep some of my objections. That is, they could
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adopt the doctrine of relative identity. This is the view that statements
of identity are always relative, so that, strictly speaking, they should be
read not as "This is the same as that," but rather "This is the same __
as that," where the blank is filled by some count noun. On this view,
something could be the same A as something else and a different B than
that something else. 21 As such, it would allow Macnamara et a1. to assert
that, e.g. someone could be the same person as someone without being
the same passenger as that someone, and thus that (P) is false. Indeed,
as the reader might have noticed already, much of what Macnamara et
a1. say sounds a lot like the relative identity theorist's position. But to
take this position would be to "tamper with the foundations of logic,"
which they have claimed they need not and will not do. In fact,
Macnamara et a1. claim explicitly to reject any interpretation of
Trinitarianism that makes use of relative identity.22 As well they should;
for the doctrine faces what most philosophers consider insuperable
objections. 23 Still, given the similarity of their view to that of the relative
identity theorist, their claims actually to have avoided such tampering
are not entirely convincing; and, as I hope to have shown, perhaps only
tampering of this sort (if only it were otherwise acceptable) would allow
them to salvage their account.
It would seem, then, that the claim of Macnamara, La Palme Reyes,
and Reyes to have shown "once and for all" that the doctrine of the
Trinity is coherent is, to say the least, greatly exaggerated; and that even
their claim to have avoided tampering with the foundations of logic is
also (though perhaps slightly less) dubious. But their attempt perhaps
serves as confirming evidence for a saying of an old professor of mine:
If you think you've "figured out" the problem of the Trinity, you've
probably fallen into some heresy or other.24

University of California, Santa Barbara
NOTES
1.

See e.g. A.P. Martinich, "Identity and Trinity," The Journal of Religion

58 (1978), 169-181; and P. van Inwagen, "And Yet They are not Three Gods

but One God," in T.V. Morris, ed., Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). Both of these
authors appeal to the doctrine of "relative identity," which will be discussed
briefly below.
2. See e.g. S.T. Davis, Logic and the Nature of God (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1983), p. 140.
3. John Macnamara, Marie La Palme Reyes, and Gonzalo E. Reyes,
"Logic and the Trinity" Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994),3-18, p. 17.
4. Ibid., p. 5.
5. Richard Cartwright, "On the Logical Problem of the Trinity," in his
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford/MIT Press, 1987), p. 188.
6. Macnamara et a1., "Logic and the Trinity," pp. 6-7. Cartwright discusses (P), without labeling it as such, on p. 196 of his paper (the most relevant portion of which is quoted on p. 5 of the Macnamara et a1. paper).
7. Macnamara et aI., "Logic and the Trinity," p. 15.
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8. Ibid., p. 4.
9. Ibid., p. 8.
10. Ibid., p. 10.
1]. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 11.
13. Some readers may find the argument of Macnamara et al. developed
in the last few pages puzzling, as an anonymous reviewer did. For it might
seem, as it did to this reviewer, that the set (1a)-(7a) is inconsistent as it
stands, irrespective of (P), since it appears to be of the form:
Oa*) Gf
(2a*) Gs
(3a*) Gh
(4a*) f s
(5a*) f h
(6a*) s h
(7a*) 3xVy(Gy=x = y)

*
*

*

and Oa*)-(7a*) are clearly inconsistent. (P) would be more clearly relevant
to the question of the consistency of a formulation of Trinitarianism, the
reviewer suggests, given an alternative statement of the doctrine having the
form:
(1b) Df
(2b) Ds
(3b) Dh
(4b) Vx(Dx:::JGx)
(5b)f s
(6b) f h
(7b) s *h
(8b) 3xVy(Gy=x = y)

*
*

where'D' stands for "is a Divine Person" and 'G' stands for "is a God." For
(4b), understood as purporting to give the logical structure of "Every Divine
Person is a God," and the following instance of (P):
(P') If every Divine Person is a God, then there cannot be fewer
Gods than Divine Persons.
together entail the proposition that there cannot be fewer Gods than Divine
persons; and this proposition, (lb)-(3b), and (5b)-(7b), together entail the
negation of (8b). So dearly, if (P) is true, (1 b)-(8b) are inconsistent.
Macnamara et al., the reviewer suggests, should therefore perhaps be understood as claiming that the "is" in some statements of the form "Every A is a
B," and in particular in "Every Divine Person is a God," expresses the
underlying relation, and in these cases, (P) can fail. That is, they might be
understood as denying, in effect, that (4b) correctly gives the logical structure of "Every Divine Person is a God," and as offering an alternative
account of the logical structure of this statement in terms of the "underlying
relation," namely:
(4b') Vx(Dx:::J3y(Gy & Uxy»
where 'U' stands for "is underlain by." And if (4b') is substituted for (4b),
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(lb)-(8b) would no longer be inconsistent, for (4b'), unlike (4b), does not
license the inference from (P') to the proposition that there cannot be fewer
Gods than Divine Persons.
In response to all of this, it should first be noted, in fairness to
Cartwright, that despite what Macnamara et a1. suppose, it is not clear that it
is his acceptance of (P) that leads him to deny the consistency of Oa)-(7a).
For in "On the Logical Problem of the Trinity," Cartwright first discusses (P)
only after denying the consistency of (1a)-(7a) (which he does on p. 192), in
the context of considering yet another construal of 0)-(7), wherein (4) is
reformulated as:
(4c) The Father is a different Divine Person from the Son.
and (5) and (6) are also reformulated in a similar way. Cartwright says
explicitly only that (P) undermines this construal of (1)-(7) (p. 196), and in
this case, (PYs relevance is more apparent. So Cartwright himself may well
accept the anonymous reviewer's claim that (P) is irrelevant to the consistency or otherwise of Oa)-(7a).
At any rate, whatever Cartwright's view is, Macnamara et a1. do think
that (P) is relevant to the issue of the consistency of (1a)-(7a). In light of the
anonymous reviewer's comments, are they mistaken in thinking so? They
are indeed if the former is right to say that Oa*)-(7a*) capture the logical
structure of (1a)-(7a). But the logical structure of (1a)-(7a) is, as we have
seen, precisely what is at issue for Macnamara et aI., and given the construal
of Oa)-(3a) they suggest, namely Oa')-(3a'), it is evident that they would
deny that he is right to say this. Furthermore, on this construal, the relevance of (P) appears clearer. And the set of sentences that results when
(1a')-(3a') are substituted for Oa)-(3a) appears to express, albeit in a slightly
different way, precisely what (1b)-(8b) do when (4b') is substituted for (4b).
So it is hard to see what advantage is to be gained by formulating the issue
in terms of the latter set of sentences rather than the former. Macnamara et
a1. (and we) have reason to prefer the former set in any case, since it more
clearly represents an attempt to reveal the logical structure of (1)-(7), which
Macnamara et a1. have rightly been taking as a paradigmatic statement of
Trinitarianism (since these sentences are extracted from the Athanasian
Creed).
14. In line with his (or her) comments dealt with in the previous note, the
anonymous reviewer suggests that, since (1a)-(7a) (read in terms of (1a*)(7a*» and (1b)-(8b) are inconsistent as they stand, no model or consistent
interpretation at all, orthodox or heretical, is possible for either set of sentences. As such, the reviewer suggests that we can perhaps instead regard
Macnamara et a1. as arguing, in effect, that the replacement of (4b) with (4b')
in (lb)-(8b) will give us a set which can be given a model, and thus be
shown to be consistent. The reviewer acknowledges that some possible
models (e.g. those in which 'U' is interpreted as "loves" or "is distinct
from") hardly seem relevant to a defense of Trinitarianism, and so to this
extent agrees with what I have argued above. But he (or she) suggests that
perhaps the main contention of Macnamara et a1. is just that their model, on
which 'U' is interpreted as expressing the underlying relation, is relevant,
"reasonable," and "reasonably orthodox."
None of this, of course, is quite what Macnamara et a1. themselves say,
but it perhaps represents a way of restating the essence of their project without committing them to the problematic claim that a model for the sentences
expressing the Trinitarian doctrine "need not be the natural or even the
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orthodox one." Nevertheless, as I argue in what follows, their account still
appears to lead them into unorthodoxy anyway.
15. Macnamara et a1., "Logic and the Trinity," p. 8.
16. An anonymous reviewer has objected to the claim that the underlying relation entails identity in every case, or even in the examples
Macnamara et a1. give. Consider again the passenger example. We may, the
reviewer says, plausibly and literally identify passengers with "actual
records in an airline database," and then say that "a single person can
underlie numerous records in the sense that she can be the 'referent' of
numerous distinct passenger records." If it is objected to this that in ordinary language, airline employees refer to their patrons, and not just to
records, as "passengers," the reviewer responds that this could be regarded
as a matter of metonymous reference. That is, just as a waiter might point to
a customer and say to another waiter "He is the poached eggs," meaning,
not that the customer is identical to the order of poached eggs, but, in effect,
that he "underlies" that order, so too, when an airline employee refers to
someone as a "passenger," he is saying that the person underlies a certain
passenger record, not that he is identical to it. And just as one person can, in
this sense, "underlie" different food orders, so too can a single person
"underlie" different passenger records. Similarly, in the Trinitarian case, we
can say that one God "underlies" the different Divine Persons in that he is
referred to metonymously via each of them (e.g. as "God the Father," "God
the Son," and "God the Holy Spirit"). And this would, of course, be consistent with God's not being identical to each of them.
Whatever can be said for or against this strategy, it is not what
Macnamara et a1. have in mind. Not only do they at no point appeal to the
notion of metonymous reference to elucidate the underlying relation, but
they develop their examples in a way that tells against any interpretation of
them in terms of it. For instance, they speak of passengers as "travelling" on
airplanes ("Logic and the Trinity," p. 9), of philosophy majors as being
"begotten" (p. 11), and so forth. So when Macnamara et a1. speak of passengers, philosophy majors, and the like, they clearly don't mean "passenger
records," "records of philosophy majors," or anything of that sort, since
records are not the sorts of things that travel on airplanes or are begotten.
Given the way Macnamara et a1. themselves characterize the underlying
relation, then, my objection stands.
But might the reviewer's suggested formulation provide a way of salvaging their account? I don't think so. Granted, the reviewer's construal of
the underlying relation doesn't, on its face, commit us to identifying any
entities related by it, but it is hard to see how it can be understood in a way
that doesn't ultimately lead to either Sabellianism or polytheism when
applied to the case at hand. For if, say, (1a)-(3a) (or Oa')-(3a'» just say that
God underlies the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the way that a restaurant
patron underlies an order of poached eggs and can be referred to metonymously via it, then the Divine Persons and God would seem to be distinct in
a way that is incompatible with orthodoxy. We could, on the one hand, take
the Divine Persons to be modes of God, distinct from him in the way the
"mode" of being a husband is distinct from any particular person who
might be a husband, and via which God can be metonymously referred to.
But this would nevertheless entail that the Divine Persons are each identical
to God (as a husband is identical to a particular person), and thus to each
other, which would contradict (4a)-(6a). On the other hand, we could take
them to be distinct deities who bear some relation to a further deity called
"God" which allows us to refer metonymously to the latter via them. But
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this would contradict (7a), in its monotheistic spirit, if not in the letter.
(Surely, (7a) isn't intended to assert merely that there is only one deity going
by the name "God"!) Either way, we are left with unorthodoxy and inconsistency. And these readings of (1a)-(3a), Sabellian and polytheistic respectively, seem to be the only sort possible if God underlies the Divine Persons
in the way one thing underlies another in the examples the anonymous
reviewer gives. One might wish to say that "underlies" doesn't in this case
behave logically in the way it does in ordinary cases. But this, like the similar suggestion considered earlier in regard to the construal of "underlies"
Macnamara et al. give, would appear to be special pleading, since the ordinary cases were themselves supposed to reveal to us the logic of the underlying relation.
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and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972).
22. Macnamara et al., "Logic and the Trinity," p. 5.
23. See e.g. John Perry, "The Same P" The Philosophical Review 70 (1979),
181-200.
24. I thank an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier version
of this paper.

